The Investment Case For
Gold
The
investment case for gold centers on the notion that the
over valuation and excessive supply of the US currency
has funded a decade’s worth of uneconomic investment and
unsustainable consumption. According to Professor Robert
Mundell, as recently quoted in The Wall Street Journal
(WSJ) Europe “There will come a time when the pileup of
international indebtedness makes reliance on the dollar
as the world’s only main currency untenable. It is no longer
necessary or even healthy for the U.S. or the rest of
the world to rely solely upon the
dollar.”
The
price of gold will rise as the dollar based system of
credit and commerce falters under an overload of bad
debt, weakening financial institutions, and a stagnant
economy. The end
of the NASDAQ mania marked the beginning of this
process. The
Enron bankruptcy, de facto default on sovereign debt by
Argentina, and a looming financial crisis in Japan are
random but high profile reminders of a deteriorating
global credit environment. Turning points in
long-term market trends rarely achieve completion within
the confines of a single business cycle. The NASDAQ blowout was
the noisiest and most visible sign of a turning
point. Much more
quiet has been the failure of the dollar price of gold
to make a new low since August of 1999, a good six
months before the Nasdaq peak.
A
revaluation of the dollar, like a credit downgrade, will
choke off the flow of capital destined to be
misspent. Its
principal manifestation is likely to be a substantially
higher gold price.
The revaluation of gold will be permanent, based
on three factors, each representing time spans of
different but overlapping durations. The three factors
are:
(1) The structure the gold
market, including the short positions, the annual flows
of physical metal, and the economics of mine production,
favors a price rise to $400 - $500. Current gold prices of
around $280/oz. do not justify sufficient investment to
maintain world gold production. Production is set to
decline slowly in the current year and more
precipitously in the years after.
(2) The deflationary climate
prompts economic policies that lead to the increased
issuance of dollars including rapid money growth and
fiscal deficits.
It will inspire protectionist measures, which
effectively devalue dollars held offshore. It will lead to rising
interest rates, inflation and weakening balance sheets.
(3) The metaphysics of gold,
or market mythology and popular perception, have the
potential to exert more influence than the other two
factors combined.
Market metaphysics change glacially over
decades. They
explain the vast swings in valuation as demonstrated by
the chart depicting the Dow Jones average by the dollar
price of an ounce of gold. These very long cycles
in the public mood range from mania to depression. Imagine the opposite of
the recent mania and you will picture the 1970’s, even
if you weren’t there.
The 1970’s featured miniscule equity valuations,
a cynical and apathetic public regard for investing, and
distrust of financial institutions, political
leadership, and currency.
Gold
Market Structure
The
current dollar gold price of $280/oz is inadequate to
justify capital investment necessary to maintain mine
output. Evidence
includes the shrinking capital base of the gold mining
industry, continuing poor returns on investment, and the
inability to attract new capital. Meanwhile, the gold
mining industry is caught up in a frantic contest to see
who will be the largest producer. While there are
possible strategic benefits for the emerging leaders,
the process in the near term promises further dilution
to long-suffering shareholders. The market cap of the
entire industry approximates McDonalds’s. The two or three “winners” in the
consolidation race will still be tiny blips on the radar
screen of capital markets. Size achieved at the
cost of shareholder dilution will not attract generalist
investors who are otherwise indifferent to gold. They are more likely
to be turned away by the industry’s disregard for
returns on capital.
Only a higher gold price will attract new money
to gold mining shares.
The
precipitous decline of exploration expenditures (see
chart below) since 1999 will lead to an accelerating
decline in mine output:
Mine
output in 2001, estimated at 2600 tonnes, is likely to
prove to be the peak, assuming no change in the gold
price. Even if
the gold price were to rise by $100/oz, the supply
response would be muted.
“Mothballed capacity” is negligible. Lower exploration
means fewer ounces are being discovered, and that ounces
mined are not being replaced. The lead-time to bring
new discoveries into production is measured in multiples
of years, even decades.
Industry production of 90mm oz per year has been
achieved at the cost of depleting capital, especially
through high grading and starving mine development
expenditures. The
“growth” in output achieved by several of the major
companies has been via acquisition rather than organic.
Following a
substantial rise during the 1990’s, world mine
production has turned static and will soon fall. A recent UBS Warburg
study: “Gold
Production Set to Plunge” dated 11/29/01 provides more
details and amplification.
The
industry’s use of “cash cost” per ounce as its principal
performance metric reveals a disregard for return on
investment, and partially explains the 18% expansion of
global production from 1991-2001 despite falling gold
prices. However,
the increase of mine supply justified by cash cost
thinking is but one explanation for the inadequate gold
price. Two
additional critical factors responsible for an
oversupply of gold were the substantial growth in
forward sales by the mining industry and outright sales
by central banks.
Forward selling or hedging by
gold companies to “lock in” margins is the antecedent of
business practices adopted by Enron and other entities
that prefer counter party to market risk. The architects of the
gold industry’s lamentable dalliance with derivatives
will engineer grief well beyond the gold sector. Financial market
exposure to interest rate and foreign exchange
derivatives dwarfs the notional value of gold and
commodity contracts. Gold derivative traders have laden
the books of their host institutions with the financial
equivalent of toxic waste dumps. The intellectual basis
for the existing gold derivative books, representing at
least 5000 tonnes, or two year’s mine production, was a
bearish view of gold and a uniformly bullish view of the
dollar.
Remediation may be costly,
long term, and vulnerable to periodic short squeeze
attacks by those who recognize that the supply of
physical gold is scarce in comparison to gold-linked paper
instruments that have been supplied by bullion
dealers. The
illiquidity of physical gold relative to gold
derivatives endangers the creditworthiness of the
issuers. A
substantially higher gold price is not in the commercial
interest of active or former bullion
dealers.
The
concentration of gold derivatives in the hands of one
institution cannot be comforting to central bankers who
had originally lent their gold reserves to a wide array
of bullion dealers.
JP Morgan Chase, also a major counter party to
Enron in a variety of energy derivatives, held 80% of
the gold derivatives reported by the OCC (Office of
Controller and Currency) as of 9/30/01. Although total gold
derivatives reported to the OCC have declined from the
peak levels of $87.6 billion at year-end 1999, JP Morgan
held only 40% of the total that time, which was prior to
the merger with Chase.
The decline in OCC-reported gold derivatives from
the 1999 year end peak is most likely due to an
offloading of positions to a non OCC reporting entity
such as Enron, an Enron-like organization, or a foreign
bank. Now that
many have abandoned the gold derivatives trade, it
appears that JP Morgan Chase has become the rear guard
to defend the derivatives universe against higher gold
prices.
The
same central bankers might also question the fact that
the hedge books of the gold mining industry already
border on negative valuations even though the dollar
price of gold is languishing. Mining executives
might respond that within their hedge books, the real
culprits were erroneous bets on local currencies,
particularly the Australian Dollar or the South African
Rand. However,
the same bankers might wonder why the capacity for error
should be limited to currency hedges but not the gold
price.
Two
years after its “hedge book induced” brush with
bankruptcy, Ashanti Goldfields still has a substantial
book of 8.4mm ounces (down from a peak of 12.2mm ounces)
despite earnest efforts to remediate and production of
more than 3mm ounces during the time span. Gold hedge
books in the best of all worlds, meaning a well-behaved
gold price, are difficult to liquidate. The easiest, lowest
cost method to repay the borrowed gold as it is mined,
returning it the bullion dealer who then repays the
central bank.
Should sentiment turn more positive or the gold
price rise, miners will accelerate deliveries into their
hedge contracts.
Accelerated hedge book liquidation would shrink
supply and accentuate a price
spike.
The
intellectual rationale for gold hedging no longer enjoys
enthusiastic support.
As one major mine company hedger said to me
recently, “ the dollar price of gold seems unable to
break $250 over the last three years, despite having
repeated chances to do so.” Based on a low
contango, or the spread between short and longer dated
interest rates, forward gold prices relative to spot
have decreased to the point where short term volatility
could easily wipe out the hedging premium. The mining industry
has already begun to respond to these new realities by
accelerating deliveries into existing hedges or by
abstaining from new hedges. Slack demand has
deflated the formerly thriving gold derivative
trade. The list
of former major bullion dealers no longer committed to
the business includes CFSB, JP Morgan (Chase has assumed
most of the former JPM book), J Aron (Goldman Sachs),
UBS, Deutsche Bank, and Dresdner. Even though these
institutions are not increasing their exposure,
previously written derivative contracts survive
somewhere in financial cyber space and constitute a very
large stale short position. The exodus has
increased the concentration of counter party risk for
mining companies and central banks alike. Mining companies face
the new headache of rollover risk when existing
contracts with departed counter parties expire. Finally, investors
have begun to differentiate between the equities of
hedgers and non-hedgers.
Since 1/2/01, the shares of Barrick Gold, the
most prominent hedger, have under performed declining 2%
vs. a 13% gain for the
XAU (Philadelphia Exchange Index of Gold Mining
stocks) as of 1/22/01.
Of
the three known extraordinary factors depressing the
gold price in recent years, central bank selling,
industry hedging, and rapid expansion of mine output,
only the first remains.
Central bank selling was motivated in part by a
desire to diversify reserve assets away from gold. In addition, they were
seeking attractive yields available from paper that
could not be provided by the “sterile” metal. The banks have been so
successful in accomplishing this that the US dollar
represents 76% of central bank reserves (2000 BIS annual
report). With
dollar interest rates plummeting to barely positive real
returns, it clear that this diversification has
accomplished little beyond substantially increasing the
risk profile of their reserve positions.
This
pendulum has swung as far as possible. Look for a change in
central banker sentiment towards gold and the dollar.
The euro and the
yen are liquid alternatives for diversification. In comparison, gold is
not liquid at the current dollar price. Gold, like an
extremely undervalued stock, might be seen as too
difficult to position.
However, the cure for illiquidity has always been
a higher price.
As central banks begin to act on their desire to
diversify away from the dollar, gold will initially seem
impractical. The
practicality issue will vanish at higher prices. At a minimum, central
bank selling will dwindle. More likely, sellers
at low prices, the banks will become avid buyers along
with the odd lotters.
With
gold trading below its mining replacement cost, the
factors responsible for this aberration dissipating, and
a massive stale short position still outstanding, why
hasn’t speculative capital been attracted to this
opportunity?
Perhaps it is only a matter of time. On the other hand,
potential new gold longs might be put off by concerns
that the gold market, is in some way, manipulated. There is ample and
credible evidence of manipulation in a number of
financial markets, including gold. History, however,
reminds us that price manipulation is unsustainable and
creates violent price adjustments when
abandoned.
The
mining replacement cost of gold appears to be in a range
of $400-$500/oz on a sustained basis, all other things
being equal.
However, that range does not take into account
the tendency for speculative excess to overshoot a
norm. It also
does not take into account factors external to the
peculiarities of the gold market. A reassessment of the
dollar or a displacement of the dollar by some
alternative and as yet unknown reserve currency would
drive the gold price well above the equilibrium range
suggested, and quite likely into four-digit
territory.
The
Deflationary Climate
“All
the factors that will lead to inflation will operate
through first weakening balance sheets, whether of the
private sector or of the government or both. Credit worries will
mushroom, increasing the attractiveness of outside
assets such as gold. Finally, the accelerating trend in
the world towards the restriction of free capital
movements and towards a contraction in the financial
services industry in general will reduce the available
alternatives to gold.” (Bernard Connolly, AIG
International Research, 1/11/02)
Aggressive rate cutting by
the Fed and other central banks, historically high rates
of monetary expansion, and a return to deficit spending
do not suggest that inflation fears are driving economic
policy. Those
fears have been displaced by the prospects of stagnant
to non-existent growth or even worse, a self-feeding
contraction of credit in which borrowers are forced to
service or repay debt through sales of
assets.
Corporate debt totaled $4.9
trillion as of 9/30/01 versus $2.4 trillion at year- end
1989. During the
same period, consumer debt reached $7.9 trillion versus
$3.5 trillion.
The 100% plus increases in both cases far
outpaced the 80% cumulative increase in GDP. During 2001, there
were three times as many credit downgrades of
corporate-credit ratings as upgrades, the fourth
consecutive yearly drop in credit quality and the
steepest decline in creditworthiness since 1991, as
chronicled in a WSJ article by Gregory Zuckerman
(12/31/01). Debt
is greater today than when the recession started. It would be unusual
for an economic recovery to commence before a cycle of
debt liquidation.
As the chart below shows, if the current
recession is indeed ending, it would be the first time
that consumer debt relative to disposable income had not
declined:
The
essential feature of a deflationary climate is that debt
burdens drive decision making by corporations and policy
makers. Too much
debt causes the economy to contract because interest and
principal must be serviced by asset sales. Not only do general
price levels decline, but so also do asset prices
including stocks and real estate. Declining lender
confidence in asset values causes credit to contract
further. A weak
economy amplifies debt burdens by cutting income, cash
flow, and expectations. The greatest threat to
economic growth then becomes a psychological shift that
favors debt reduction over expanded consumption or
investment. That
is why the current thrust of US economic policy is to
reduce the real and psychological impact of debt. The sole sign of its
success will be a subsequent increase in the
indebtedness of all sectors. Fearing a
market-driven full-blown recession, which would restore
liquidity and thereby establish a sound basis for
long-term expansion, policy makers prefer the short-term
solution of digging an even deeper
hole.
The
defining feature of the current economic landscape is
not the events of 9/11 but Enron. Does anyone besides TV
financial network commentators believe that the use of
Enron’s flawed practices were isolated? Maximum leverage and
accounting deception were at the core of the 1990’s
culture.
Corporate icons such as IBM and GE employed these
tactics as well as lesser-known entities. Enron has unleashed
long simmering concerns about credit and earnings
quality that will not quickly disappear. The chart below, which
shows the surge in quality credit spreads, clearly
depicts credit deflation:
The
precipitous and wholesale abandonment of the anti
inflationary policies of the 1990’s, pivotal to the
strong dollar, must suggest second thoughts to central
bankers sitting on their vast accumulations of
dollars.
Undoubtedly, the October ’01 downgrade of the
dollar by the Chinese was driven by such
considerations.
In case the first announcement went unnoticed,
the Chinese reiterated their intentions rather loudly on
January 7th 2002. As reported in the
Daily Telegraph, Chinese foreign minister Xiang
Huaicheng said “I will instruct the responsible
authorities that they should not just have a currency
basket but rather that they should buy euros as quickly
as possible.” The
European Commission added “China and the European Union
share a joint suspicion of American ‘hegemony’ in the
global economic system and have been edging toward
mutual embrace for several years. Beijing has a strong
interest in promoting a rival currency, but it has been
waiting for evidence that the euro is a viable long-term
currency before committing itself….” The Chinese apparently
had fewer reservations about another alternative to the
US currency.
Holding more than $200 billion of US financial
instruments, they have been steady, low profile buyers
of gold in recent years, and have just announced an
increase in their gold holdings of 120 tonnes. Chinese gold reserves
now stand at 500 tonnes, still a small percentage of
their total reserves.
The
Chinese euro announcement preceded by a mere week
another interesting downgrade by Moody’s. In the second
instance, the recipient of the lower rating was the
commercial paper of General Motors from P-1 to P-2.
As a result, the
strongest of the big three automakers can no longer
market its commercial paper to money market funds at a
time when growing cash losses are forcing it to rely
more on external financing, even though 2001 was the
second highest year on record for industry car sales. GM
shares a plight similar to Ford and Chrysler, which have
together steadily lost market share to foreign
manufacturers since the mid 1980’s. Despite years of
booming auto markets, GM’s debt has increased and profit
margins have decreased.
Both
the dollar and GM downgrades were brought about by the
all too successful strong dollar policy concocted during
the Clinton administration by Treasury Secretary Rubin
and Undersecretary Summers. The key tenets of that
policy were fiscal surpluses, integrated global capital
markets, deregulation, free trade and low
inflation. These
policies were transmitted ad nauseam through the
financial media. The rhetoric and
theatrics of transmittal included tame inflation, low
interest rates, a rising stock market, and a low gold
price. The payoff
was the ability to issue dollars to our trading partners
without restraint.
Unfettered dollar issuance, an “exorbitant
privilege” in the words of Charles de Gaulle, permitted
the de facto globalization of the supply chain for the
American consumer and business. Access to international
capacity is the real secret behind low reported
inflation. Cheap
capital, in the form of low long-term interest rates and
lofty equity valuations, was a co-benefit of the low
inflation myth. Less favorable was that
the decade-long pile up of dollar indebtedness became
the foundation of consumer prosperity and booming
financial markets. A second unfavorable
consequence was a significant deterioration of the US
external financial position. Finally, the NASDAQ
mania, fueled by under priced capital, funded a
sufficient quantity of uneconomic projects to cripple
capital investment and credit markets for
years.
Most
of the fundamental underpinnings and theatrics of the
strong dollar are history. They have been
succeeded by down-trending stock prices, fragile
consumer confidence, a stagnant economy, and plummeting
productivity.
Only a weak gold price and an overvalued dollar
survive. The
original architects and lead proponents of the strong
dollar have been succeeded by a new administration,
quite possibly with different thinking. That new thinking
could include recognition that the quick fix to
intractable economic issues would be a cheapening of the
currency.
Vigorous counter-deflationary policies, current
and prospective, threaten to undermine the wealth of
non-US investors that hold $6.4 trillion of US assets
including 38% of the outstanding treasury debt, 20% of
US corporate debt, and 8% of US equities.
The
question remains as to against what the dollar will
weaken. Neither
of its principal rivals, the yen and the euro, seems
appealing other than the fact that they represent liquid
alternatives to the dollar. Should the expected US
recovery fall short of expectations, or should a
synchronized global recession prove unexpectedly
prolonged, a principal casualty will be the standing and
the value of the US dollar. A general downgrading
of the dollar will lead to a reversal of capital flows,
meaning that $ trillions of US assets held abroad will
become a source of funds. A reversal of capital
flows will induce a sharp decline against the euro and
the yen, warts notwithstanding, and will be followed by
rising interest rates, reported inflation, and a much
higher gold price.
The
perils of deflation are not unrecognized. In July, the NY Times
noted that the strong dollar “is making exporters non
competitive in international markets” and could in part
be blamed for weak corporate profits, job losses, and
faltering stock prices.
In June, Bridgewater Daily Observations noted
that “when economies are doing well most everyone
believes in the beauty and efficiency of the free
markets and free trade, but when the economy turns south
people come out of the woodwork to decry the evils of
unfettered markets.” (Bridgewater Daily
Observations, 6/01). Among those to come out
of the woodwork has been the steel industry, which has
recently succeeded in paving the way for raising tariffs
on imported steel by up to 40%. Free trade advocates
note that the annual cost to consumers will approach
$2.4 billion a year.
Another recent protectionist measure was the
recent passage of tariffs to limit imports of Canadian
lumber. If
economic weakness persists, trade barriers will
proliferate.
The
dilemma for economic policy is that the exigencies of
combating deflation have considerable potential to
undermine confidence in the dollar. Former Treasury
secretary Rubin testified before Congress, “modifying
our strong dollar policy could adversely affect
inflation, interest rates, and capital inflows and would
lessen the favorability of our terms of exchange with
the rest of the world.”
Despite these dangers, NY Times columnist Paul
Krugman recently wrote
“the strong dollar is one of the reasons the Fed
is having trouble pulling us back from the brink. So right now, a weaker
dollar is in America’s interests.” Krugman likens the
rising dollar to a Ponzi scheme, which is about to “run
out of suckers.”
Does
the recently launched euro have unappreciated merits as
some think? Will
Japan’s fortunes take a turn for the better and lead to
surprising appreciation in the yen? Either possibility has
to be considered, but it seems more likely that the
overcooked bull market in the dollar will unravel like
NASDAQ, under the weight of its own overvaluation. As with that mania,
skeptics were pariahs until the damage was obvious.
Given the
excessive central bank and capital market concentration
in the US dollar, its extreme overvaluation relative to
its counterparts, and the as yet unrecognized erosion of
the dollar’s fundamentals, almost any minor event could
tip psychology and trigger an Enron-like meltdown. In that scenario,
holders of dollars will look for liquid alternatives and
ask questions later. Central banks will
suspend gold sales and balk at rolling over bullion
loans. Market
sentiment towards financial assets will sour
further. The bear
market in financial assets, already underway, will
become more widely recognized.
Market
Metaphysics
Markets are above all driven
by psychology and emotion. The progression from
the previous nadir of pessimism in 1974 to the peak
bubble optimism was imperceptible in the moment but a
powerful determinant of price extremes. The new economy
paradigm and the love affair with technology are
transient phases that will be replaced by preoccupation
with as yet unidentified concerns.
There is no way to figure
extremes of valuation without considering psychology and
market mythology.
While the usual fundamental considerations of
real interest rates and earnings are starting points for
valuation, expectations or beliefs as to the future
course of events are decidedly non- quantitative. Since 1910, the P/E
ratio of the S&P has averaged approximately
15x. In that span
of more than 90 years, the P/E has exceeded 25x only six
times. Bear
markets typically end in single digit territory. Recent S&P P/E
measures in excess of 30x suggest confidence remains
unbroken by the yearlong drubbing in stocks and the
recession.
Meaningful change in market psychology spans
decades. Shifts
are imperceptible in the context of shorter- term market
and business cycles.
However, there is no mistaking the contrast in
mood that existed at the peak of the NASDAQ bubble just
a short while ago, and the mood that prevailed at the
1974 low and for several years thereafter. How markets travel
from one extreme to the other is unknowable. What is clear is the
preponderance of confidence or the lack of it at each
extreme.
In a
1997 speech (Leuven, Belgium) Alan Greenspan stated “a
nation’s sovereign credit rating lies at the base of its
current fiscal, monetary, and, indirectly, regulatory
policy. When
there is confidence in the integrity of government,
monetary authorities---the central bank and the finance
ministry---can issue unlimited claims denominated in
their own currencies and can guarantee or stand ready to
guarantee the obligations of private issuers as they see
fit.” This
statement, extracted from Dr. Larry Park’s monograph “
What does Mr. Greenspan Really Think?”, describes
the essence of the strong dollar policy and suggests the
pivotal condition, “confidence in its integrity” for it
to remain in effect.
Clearly, the highly indebted external position
and continuing large trade deficit of the United States
suggest that a “high level of confidence” has existed
for many years.
For
some time, the integrity of the gold market has been a
subject of much question by a small minority who
maintain an interest in such matters. Although the metal’s
dollar price has been relegated to sideshow status by
most, there can be little doubt the low price has been
one of the most important sound bytes for mass
consumption underpinning the low inflation mythology of
the new economy and the strong dollar. A long-standing
affectation of disinterest by officialdom and market
gurus begins to resemble the famous “dog that didn’t
bark” in the Sherlock Holmes mystery. Gold retains its
financial market role as the “canary in the coal
mine.” A sharply
rising gold dollar price would send a clear message to
even the most casual observer that something is awry
with the Fed’s “fine tuning” of the economy and
financial markets.
If
the dollar gold price’s submissive behavior over the
last five years has been the product of opportunistic
interventions in the name of crisis management,
admission of this would be unthinkable. In the context of
world financial flows, gold is small and well within the
resources of the US Treasury’s Exchange Stabilization
Fund on its own, or in league with other governments and
commercial interests, to manage. Undersecretary
Summer’s scholarly work completed while a Harvard
faculty member, “Gibson’s Paradox”, suggested that
dollar gold prices would vary inversely with real
interest rates as measured by 30-year bonds. However, this
relationship broke down in 1996 during Summers’ tenure
at the Treasury.
To our thinking, there is no more powerful
evidence to support the notion that the gold price has
been rigged than the chart below depicting the
relationship.
Should the distortion of the gold market
indicated by this chart come to an end, the subsequent
rise in interest rates would severely undermine the
viability of interest rate swap contracts. JP Morgan’s
derivatives exposure of $30.4 trillion as of 9/30/01 and
approximately 60% of the total for OCC reporting
entities, is dominated by bets on interest rates. It is safe to assume
that those bets don’t include interest rate levels that
would accompany gold prices in excess of $400/oz.
This chart is courtesy of Nick Laird, proprietor
of http://www.sharelynx.net/.
It plots average monthly gold prices inverted on the
right scale and real long-term interest rates (30-year
t-bond minus latest twelve month CPI) on the left scale.
The historical relationship disintegrates in 1995.
In
isolation, manipulation of the gold market might be
dismissed as a well-intentioned exercise in market
stability, the thought being that a misbehaving gold
price would undermine the very confidence identified by
Greenspan as so precious. However, to regard the
manipulation of the gold price as an isolated matter
would require a suspension of belief greater than for
those who found value in dot com stocks. In fact, intervention
in all markets including equities, bonds, currencies,
and commodities has long been standard operating
procedure for the Fed and the
Treasury.
The
invariable response to market shocks that threatened the
now infamous virtuous circle of a strong currency and
the bull market was decisive market intervention by the
Federal Reserve and US Treasury. For
example:
- Market crises triggered by
the Asian meltdown, the Russian default, the collapse of
LTCM, and plummeting stock prices post the NASDAQ mania,
were countered by injections of liquidity by the Federal
Reserve along with high profile public statements of
assurance to the markets.
- The cosmetics of low
inflation were fortified by debasement of Bureau of
Labor Statistics inflation measures through dubious
hedonic price adjustments and false productivity
measures.
- A flare up in the gold
price caused by a short squeeze following the Washington
Agreement in 1999 was doused by fresh liquidity
solicited from Kuwait, the Vatican, and Singapore. As
discussed later, these maneuvers included mobilization
of US gold reserves.
- The attempt to bring down
long-term rates by suspending issuance of 30-year
treasuries is the most recent and clumsiest of notable
anti-market actions.
- In the true spirit of
globalization, the government of Italy manipulated its
own bond market to hide the true size of its budget
deficit in order to be admitted to the European single
currency. In a
report published by the International Securities Market
Association (November, 01), a currency bond swap was
completed in 1997 to mask the true size of the country’s
internal deficit.
The transaction was orchestrated by Long Term
Capital Management, which counted the Italian Central
Bank among its clients.
Richard Russell, a veteran
stock market observer recently concluded that the stock
market was being manipulated: “I’ve resisted this idea
for a long time, but slowly and surely I’ve come to the
conclusion that yes, the Fed does step in at various
times and manipulate the market…. One of those
‘manipulation junctures’ is right now. The Enron mess hit the
markets, some indices that I follow were right on the
edge, and ‘normally’ I would have expected the markets
….to follow through on the downside today. But lo and behold,
buying came in at the opening and the market pushed
higher.” He goes
on to say that “all manipulation does is hold off the
inevitable.”
During the Clinton
administration, auctions of 30 year treasuries were
scaled back, some suggested, in order to lower interest
costs to the government by emphasizing low coupon
short-term maturities.
Perhaps at a time when a wide spread existed
between opposite ends of the yield curve, this might
have made sense, but how to explain the recent
suspension of 30 year issues altogether? With long-term
interest rates already low, many saw this move as a not
too subtle attempt to manipulate long-term interest
rates by creating a scarcity of paper. As quoted in Grant’s
Interest Rate Observer, Ron Ryan (Ryan Labs) said, “When
interest rates are low, the logical borrower wants to
lock it up for as long as possible…Now they have done
the Las Vegas bet that the two-year note auction rolled
over 15 times, will have an average interest cost lower
than the 30-year today.”
In
the same article, Grant says: “A…deserving object of
anger is the government’s habitual recourse to market
manipulation, whether through interest rates or mind
games. We cling
to the view that the U.S. dollar is vulnerable to a loss
of confidence, with an attendant risk of rising interest
rates. Market
manipulation by market manipulation, the Treasury and
Fed are dissipating this
confidence.”
Greenspan reveals the
intellectual rationale for market interventions in his
Leuwen speech: “open market operations, in situations
like that which followed the crash of stock markets
around the world in 1987, satisfy increased needs for
liquidity for the system as a whole that otherwise could
feed cumulative, self-reinforcing, contractions across
many financial markets.”
Events subsequent to the 1987 market crash that
exceed the Fed’s pain threshold included the Asian
meltdown, the Russian Defaults, the Y2K scare, the
NASDAQ crash, and Enron.
While Greenspan is aware that the use of
sovereign credit creates moral hazard, i.e., the
distortion of incentives that occurs when the party that
determines the level of risk receives the gains from but
is not exposed to the costs of, the risks taken, he
cannot seem to find the appropriate limit for such
intervention. To
play it safe, the bar for intervention has been steadily
lowered while the buildup of debt has multiplied
systemic risk.
The
Rubin/Summers Treasury and the Greenspan Fed bear the
principal responsibility for creating the mania. The liberal use of
sovereign credit by the Fed and Treasury over the past
decade to bail out bad banks, insolvent hedge funds, and
investors in foreign government paper, materially
altered the calculation of risk by investors,
corporations, and financial institutions. By removing the risk
from serious investment mistakes, these policies
incentivized the employment of excessive leverage that
in turn inflated “the bubble.”
The
disrespect for market outcomes reflected in US economic
and financial policies is neither new nor inconsistent
with the behavior of senior government officials
throughout history.
The London Gold Pool scheme to hold down the gold
price illustrates autocratic anti-market behavior four
decades ago. A
striking non-economic example came with the recent
release of the private tapes of Lyndon B. Johnson, which
revealed that his public and private views on the
Vietnam War were in complete opposition. It would seem
that the grounds for distrust and cynicism are almost
always present.
What changes is the willingness of the public and
the markets to look the other way. That willingness in
turn would seem to be driven by whether the course of
events appears to be satisfactory or unsatisfactory.
The unwillingness
of senior officials and policy makers to own up to the
adverse consequences of their previous actions explains
the phenomenon of digging ever-deeper policy holes. The refusal to accept
the retribution of market outcomes explains a “culture
of obfuscation”, to employ a former Clinton attorney’s
(Lanny Davis) phrase, at the core of all scams, whether
in the public or private sector.
The
manipulation of the gold price, seen in the context of
an autocratic inner circle of policy makers committed to
nothing more than their own career advancement, seems
highly plausible.
The mechanics of this manipulation are murky, at
best. However,
valuable insight is provided by the work of James Turk
in “Accounting for the ESF’s Gold Swaps” (1/7/02 Freemarket Gold &
Money Report.)
While his complex analysis of the mechanics and
the accounting may be less than perfect, it is in my
opinion substantially on the money. The bottom line is
that US government official gold reserves have been
mobilized through swap and loan arrangements to suppress
the gold price, particularly in the aftermath of the
Sept. 1999 Washington Agreement, which triggered a
violent short squeeze.
These arrangements in turn have been papered over
and covered up by a succession of changes in financial
statement nomenclature, accounting artifices, and
document destruction ("That Shreddin’ Fed" by Robert
Auerbach in Barron’s) reminiscent of Watergate or the
most elaborate financial frauds yet known. At the end of the day,
far more official sector gold appears to have been
squandered to tame the dollar gold price than the
generally accepted 5000 tonne short position
countenanced by the Bank for International Settlements
or Goldfield Mineral Services. Therefore, investors may
contemplate a substantially higher dollar gold price
target than previously seemed
reasonable.
It
is not unusual for the perception of a market, such as
the dollar gold price, to lag fundamental change to a
significant degree.
However, the lag in this instance is especially
great. Investors
need to grasp not only the structural issues pertaining
to the market itself, but also the interplay of these
issues with the macro aspects of economic policy,
currency valuation, and market psychology. This is
especially difficult when significant information is
withheld or obscured. In light of the
substantial shift in fundamentals and the extreme lag in
the recognition of these changes, the magnitude of the
market adjustment is likely to be surprising. Whether the price
adjustment occurs quickly or evolves over several years,
the outcome will be a dollar gold price that is
comfortably within four-digit territory.
The
damage caused by an epic investment mania cannot be
undone simply by a one or two year decline in stock
prices. A mania
causes a vast misallocation of capital. Over investment in
high tech was only the most visible manifestation of
this capital misallocation. On the other side was
under-investment in key areas. We are saturated with
computers, cell phones, SUV’s, casinos, lawyers and
debt, but there will be shortages of basic materials and
industrial capacity when the dollar loses its preeminent
status.
What
produced the giddy valuations of the mania in part was
investor confidence that highly competent management of
the economy had produced a new era of business cycle
stability, low inflation and continuous growth. In fact, these
expectations rest on policies that have increasingly
painted their proponents into a corner. In order to maintain
credibility, ever more transparent manipulations will be
called for and resorted to. In the process,
credibility will be destroyed. To quote Grant again,
“Mr. Greenspan has become a living symbol of the
efficacy of price fixing. But it’s likely that
sometime before his career is over, he will become a
symbol of the futility of that black art.” (WSJ
4/01)
Greenspan epitomizes the
vigorous anti-market culture that has become entrenched
at the core of economic policy making. Operating in the
shadows of constitutionality, a “plunge protection team”
consisting of Rubin/Summers/Greenspan “clones” monitors
world financial markets contemplating the need for
introducing US sovereign credit to achieve acceptable
outcomes. The team was an organic outgrowth of the
1990’s climate of morality that legitimized and
institutionalized deception and obfuscation. The intellectual
heritage of this group is more in sync with the central
planners of the former Soviet Union than with the free
market champions they are perceived to be. Unlike their Soviet
counterparts, the plunge protection team operates
outside the realm of established government institutions
and accountability.
However, the fate all central planners share is
the certitude that market forces will topple their
designs.
Conclusion
The
new economic paradigm is that credit deflation begets
inflationary outcomes.
Gold, far from being irrelevant and antiquated,
is the ideal lens through which to appraise this
reality. As
perfect credit, it will become more highly valued when
investors attempt to shed assets impaired by decades of
imperfect credit.
A four-digit handle on the dollar gold price will
signify not that the markets love gold. Instead, it will mean
that they despise the alternatives. There is no specific
reason to think that the movement in this direction
should be precipitous.
Bear markets have a way of taking their time, the
better to deceive and to entrap as many as
possible. Those
who believe a business upturn will end the bear market
will be among them. While there may appear to be no
particular rush, violent shifts in market views usually
come with little warning. An allocation in favor
of gold would seem to be timely. The dollar’s days as
the premier global reserve currency are numbered. The repercussions of a
dollar revaluation will be profound and long-lived. It is not too soon for
investors to assume defensive positions in light of
these prospects and it will not be long before they
discover that gold is a core component of investment
defense.
John
Hathaway
January 23,
2002 © Tocqueville Asset Management
L.P. The following web sites
were helpful in the preparation of this article, and are
excellent resources for additional information on the
gold market, especially with regard to the issue of gold
price manipulation: http://www.lemetropolecafe.com/;
http://www.gata.org/;
and http://www.goldensextant.com/.
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